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  Audit Market Competition: Auditor Changes and the Impact of Tendering 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Increased competition within the external audit market and the recent phenomenon of 
audit tendering has renewed interest in the factors influencing auditor changes. In this 
paper, a questionnaire instrument is used to elicit perceptions of the factors which 
influence auditor-client realignments in this new environment and to indicate the relative 
influence of economic and behavioural factors. Positive, statistically significant 
associations were found between unsolicited approaches and the consideration of either a 
change in auditor or the conduct of a competitive tender. Fees are both the most 
frequently cited reason for considering auditor change and the most frequently cited 
factor influencing the selection of a new auditor. The chemistry of the relationship with 
senior audit firm personnel was ranked as more important than service issues in new 
auditor selection. Several significant associations between the reasons for change and 
both company size and type of change are identified. In particular, smaller companies, 
and companies changing from a non-Big Six firm, were more likely to change due to the 
need for a wider range of services and the influence of third parties. Findings indicated 
that 55% of auditor changes were effected by means of a tender, with the incumbent 
auditor having only an 18% chance of retaining the client. The various stages of the 
tender process appear to be dominated by the finance director, with audit committees 
having a restricted role. Tenders resulted in significant fee reductions in the year of 
change. 
 
 
 
Keywords: auditor change, audit quality, audit tender, auditor independence, low-balling, 
opinion-shopping, price cutting. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
The last decade has seen major changes in economic and regulatory aspects of the 
auditing environment in many countries. These changes began with the worldwide 
recession, dating from the late 1980s, which led to a significant increase in the level of 
competition within the external audit market. Many companies failed, resulting in 
overcapacity on the supply side of the market, while those companies which survived 
sought to cut costs, including the audit fee. The fee minimisation strategies employed by 
companies included aggressive renegotiation with the incumbent auditor and the 
emergence of audit tendering.1 It is also alleged that companies felt more able, due to 
their increased bargaining power, to `opinion shop', i.e., to exert pressure on the 
incumbent auditor to change their opinion by seeking a second view on an accounting or 
auditing issue (Waller, 1991).2 Audit firms also appeared to adapt their behaviour in 
response to these new competitive pressures: audit fees began to decline in real terms, 
and there were prima facie cases of `low-balling', where incoming auditors were believed 
to have secured their appointment by offering significant fee reductions. In addition, a 
number of international audit firms merged in the late 1980s, with further mergers among 
mid-tier and lower-tier firms occurring at the national level. 
 
These behavioural changes have generated concern among the profession's regulatory 
bodies, since they undermine the actual or perceived quality of the audit function, 
principally by threatening auditor independence. For example, in the UK, the chairman 
of the Financial Reporting Council stated that `the highly competitive nature of the audit 
market, the right of directors to seek an "alternative" opinion where an auditor's guidance 
is unwelcome, and their ability to control audit fees, may be seen as a potential source of 
pressure on auditors...' (Financial Reporting Council, 1991, p.6).3In the US, the Texas 
Public Accountancy Act specifies that audits performed for less than reasonable labour 
costs violate independence. Those auditors found guilty could lose their practising 
licence. Similarly, in the UK, the Chartered Accountants' Ethical Guide has been revised 
to require audit firms who offer fees lower than another to ensure that clients are not 
misled as to the services covered or the determination of current or future fee levels and, 
where audit work is obtained, be able (in the event of a complaint) to demonstrate that 
independence and quality are unimpaired (ICAEW, 1994, p.227). A recent ICAEW 
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working group has, however, found `no evidence of a reduction in quality or 
effectiveness of audit work arising as a result of competitive pricing' (ICAEW, 1995). 
 
This changing environment of the external audit market has impacted upon the three 
principal inter-related dimensions of this market: pricing, auditor-client alignments, and 
audit quality. The present paper focuses on auditor-client realignments and related 
pricing issues. Increased competition is believed to have resulted in tendering, audit fee 
discounting, low-balling, opinion-shopping, and audit firm mergers. Tendering has been 
specifically identified as a means by which independence is threatened (Moizer, 1994, 
p.20). Direct consequences of this behaviour are real decreases in audit fees and an 
increase in auditor switching. In the US, Maher, Tiessen, Colson & Broman (1992) found 
that, after controlling for the effect of changes in company size, complexity, and risk, real 
audit fees fell between 1977 and 1981, a period of apparent increasing competition, while 
in the UK real audit fees paid by the top 100 publicly traded companies fell in 1992 and 
1994 (Accountancy, November 1992; Accountancy Age, 26th May 1994). Evidence of 
price cutting associated with auditor changes has been found in both the US (Simon & 
Francis, 1988), and the UK (Pong & Whittington, 1994; Gregory & Collier, 1996), 
although not in Australia (Butterworth & Houghton, 1995). In a recent study of changing 
levels of auditor concentration in the UK listed company market, there was found to be a 
general increase in concentration from 1987 to 1991, with the six-firm concentration ratio 
rising from 0.546 to 0.723. This increase was attributable to both voluntary realignments 
and audit firm mergers. The annualised rate of voluntary realignments was high 
compared to that found in previous periods and in other countries, indicating greater 
instability in auditor-client relationships (Beattie & Fearnley, 1994, pp.319-320). The 
need to understand the effect of increased competition on the factors influencing auditor 
changes is emphasised by Anderson, Stokes & Zimmer (1993, p.65). 
 
At present, the theory of auditor choice and change is grounded in economic theory. It is 
recognised, however, that this extant theory is not comprehensive (Knapp & Elikai, 1988, 
p.78). In particular, we argue that this economic theory is deficient in three areas.  First, it 
does not address the specific audit firm selected from a general class.  Second, the 
imperfect explanatory power of statistical models indicates that extant theory is unable to 
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rationalise the cause of a significant number of auditor changes, and third, that there are 
companies which, though predicted to change auditors, do not do so. 
 
We suggest here that these deficiencies are due partly to a failure to incorporate 
behavioural factors into theoretical explanations of the choice process.  For example, the 
specific choice of audit firm is often attributed to positive personal client-auditor 
relationships, with negative relationships giving rise to auditor changes in some cases 
(Eichenseher and Shields, 1983). More generally, the potential for new insights into 
buyers' behaviour is offered by the `relationships approach' to professional services 
developed in the service marketing literature, which classifies relationships (in the 
present case, auditor-client relationships) based on buyer type (Sharma, 1994). This 
approach can explain, for example, why some buyers remain loyal to one seller, while 
others are inherently bargainers. Thus an economics-based framework can be expected to 
provide only a partial explanation of auditor choice.  The relative influence of economic 
and behavioural factors in this choice process awaits detailed empirical research.   
 
Aims and objectives 
The general aim of the present study is to extend our understanding of the range of 
factors influencing auditor changes within the current external auditing environment, 
which is characterised by increased competition. Existing beliefs are based largely on 
intuition and casual empiricism and, from a research perspective, it is important to 
confirm or refute these beliefs on the basis of systematic empirical evidence. This aim is 
achieved by means of a questionnaire survey of 508 listed UK company finance 
directors. This method provides richer insights than is possible using secondary data 
analyses, which focuses on economic factors, since the questionnaire instrument includes 
both economic and behavioural factors. Questionnaires do, however, (in common with 
all research methods) have inherent limitations, resulting from non-response bias, 
uninformed respondent bias, variable interpretation of the meaning to be attributed to key 
terms, and conscious or unconscious misreporting. 
 
The process of auditor change can be separated into two principal stages (Francis & 
Wilson, 1988, p.668) - the decision to change and the choice of new auditor. Our general 
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objective is to investigate and compare the relative influence of economic and 
behavioural factors at each stage of this process. In addition, this study explores audit 
tendering, which is a pricing mechanism only recently used in the audit market. To 
achieve this, we have developed nine specific objectives, which fall into three groups, 
moving from the general to the more specific:  
 The general incidence and effectiveness of alternative auditor change 
mechanisms 
 1. to establish the incidence of various mechanisms (i.e., unsolicited approach 
from audit firm, approach by company to another audit firm, audit tender) 
through which auditor-client realignments can occur within the population; 
 2. to investigate whether there exists an association between an unsolicited 
approach by an audit firm and the consideration of either a change in auditor or 
the conduct of a competitive tender within the population; 
 Factors relating to auditor changes 
 3. to document the declared reasons why companies considered changing auditor 
and compare the responses of `changers' with `non-changers'; 
 4. to investigate the association, if any, between the incidence of auditor change 
and client company industry, size, and the existence of an audit committee;  
 5. to investigate the association, if any, between declared reasons for change and 
(a) company size, and (b) type of change (i.e., to/from a Big Six/non Big Six 
firm); 
 6. to identify the factors influencing the selection of a new auditor; 
 7. to identify the effects of auditor change on the client company; and 
 Factors relating to audit tendering 
 8. to investigate the association, if any, between the incidence of audit tendering 
and client company industry, size, and the existence of an audit committee; 
 9. to collect descriptive data on the tendering process, i.e., the number of firms 
invited to tender, the basis of their selection, and the parties involved. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  Section two reviews the extant 
auditor choice literature and identifies the importance of behavioural factors which may 
affect auditor-client alignments.  Section three outlines the sample and data collection 
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procedures employed.  The results, together with discussion, are presented  
in section four.  The final section summarises and concludes.  
 
 AUDITOR CHANGE LITERATURE 
 
Auditor choice depends upon the client's characteristics, potential auditors' 
characteristics, and the auditing environment. For a company to change its auditor, there 
needs to be a significant change in one (or more) of these three factors, since switching 
costs (direct and indirect) are material.4 Auditor change can have a number of 
consequences, such as a share price reaction, change in audit fee, change in audit opinion 
and/or a change in the quantity of non-audit services (NAS) purchased from the 
incumbent. 
 
The auditor choice literature emerged 25 years ago in response to concerns that long 
periods of auditor tenure, whilst potentially resulting in improved service and lower fees, 
may impair the auditor's independence.  Early empirical studies predated theoretical 
work, and initially took the form of questionnaire studies, which collected management's 
declared reasons for actual auditor changes (Burton & Roberts, 1967; Bedingfield & 
Loeb, 1974).  Given the absence of any theoretical framework, these questionnaires were 
apparently open-ended in nature.  Carpenter & Strawser (1971) selected for questioning 
only companies making an initial public offering, in order to investigate the hypothesis 
that this event often triggers an auditor change. 
 
These early studies suffered from two major problems.  First, the method used typically 
generates unidimensional responses and, second, the analysis of responses involves a 
degree of subjective classification.  To overcome these problems, Eichenseher & Shields 
(1983) used an indirect semantic-differential scaling method to rate clients' perceptions 
about the attributes of their displaced and new auditors.  Eleven auditor characteristics 
were rated, with perceived changes in the relative levels of fees and quality of working 
relationships emerging as most strongly associated with auditor changes.  
 
Wallace (1985) provided one of the first theoretical analyses of the demand for external 
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audit services. She identified three related sources of demand: agency (or stewardship) 
demand, information demand and insurance demand.  An audit can reduce the agency 
costs attributable to self-interested behaviour and information asymmetries. Since agency 
costs vary, there is a heterogeneous demand for audit services, characterised by deAngelo 
(1981a, b) as different levels of audit quality.  Information asymmetries also generate the 
information demand for audit. The selection of credible auditors not only signals 
management's honesty and quality, but also reduces agency costs via the monitoring 
function.  This particular form of audit differentiation was explored originally by Dopuch 
& Simunic (1980 and 1982).  The arguments of both deAngelo and Dopuch & Simunic 
are often referred to as the `product differentiation hypothesis'. The third source of 
demand is provided by the insurance dimension of an audit, insofar as investors and 
creditors are indemnified against financial loss via the auditor's professional liability 
exposure. 
 
Demand-side factors indicate client characteristics (in particular, agency-related factors 
such as size, level of gearing, and management share ownership) which will determine 
the type of audit firm selected, in terms of its quality and credibility.  The specific audit 
firm chosen is also influenced by supply-side factors, i.e., auditor characteristics such as 
specialisation in audit technologies, industry specialisation, and the quality of working 
relationships with the audit team. Specialisation can be expected to yield both economies 
of scale, which permit firms to offer competitive fees, and economies of scope, which 
enable the provision of sophisticated audit services in addition to a range of NAS.    
 
Several other client or auditor characteristics have been cited as relevant in the auditor 
choice decision.  First, it is argued that the existence of significant foreign operations 
increases the likelihood that a large audit firm will be selected since these firms can 
achieve multinational scale economies (Eichenseher, 1985).  Second, it is argued that 
auditor choice can be partly explained by the existence of interlocking directorates 
between client companies (Davison, Stening & Wai, 1984).  Third, client and auditor 
structure are believed to be associated, with unstructured clients choosing unstructured 
auditors and vice versa (Kaplan, Menon & Williams, 1990).5 Finally, the geographical 
proximity of the auditor has been argued to be relevant since it permits a flexible and 
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timely response to client needs (Stokes, 1992). 
 
In the 1980s, statistical studies using publicly available data employed an indirect 
approach, examining the association between a specific client or auditor characteristic 
and observed auditor choice, initially using univariate tests.  The specific characteristics 
examined were those economic factors cited frequently in the early questionnaire studies 
and/or arising from a priori theory.  
 
Statistical studies have examined the association between either (i) specific client or 
auditor characteristics and observed auditor choices, or (ii) changes in these 
characteristics and observed auditor changes. Firth & Smith (1992) find that the selection 
of a Big Eight audit firm (a brand name proxy for audit quality) is associated with agency 
cost variables and the need for signalling. Positive associations have been found between 
the propensity to change auditors and the early and late stages of the auditor-client 
relationship (Levinthal & Fichman, 1988), initial public offerings (Menon & Williams, 
1991), disagreements (deAngelo, 1982), and financial distress (Schwartz & Menon, 
1985; Schwartz & Soo, 1994). Moreover, Dhaliwal, Schatzberg & Trombley (1993) find 
that clients changing auditor after a disagreement have poorer economic performance 
than comparable non-changers. The relatively high frequency of auditor change 
associated with corporate takeovers where companies changed to the acquiror's auditor, 
is taken as evidence of economies of scale by Anderson, Stokes & Zimmer (1993).  
Chow & Rice (1982), Craswell (1988), and Citron & Taffler (1992) find a positive 
relationship between auditor change and the receipt of a qualified audit opinion, although 
this finding is not supported by Schwartz & Menon (1985). Krishnan (1994) finds 
evidence that it is the auditor's overall conservatism (reflected in their tendency to issue 
qualified opinions), rather than the receipt of a qualification per se, which triggers the 
change.  The propensity to change auditors has, however, been found not to be related to 
the level and type of NAS purchased (DeBerg, Kaplan & Pany, 1991). 
 
More recent multivariate studies have shown auditor changes to be associated with the 
incumbent's industry specialisation and tenure, the receipt of adverse media publicity by 
the client company (Williams, 1988), client company financial distress, size and mergers, 
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and the market share and size of the auditor (Lindahl, 1992), client financial distress, 
size, and growth, together with audit firm fee levels and industry dominance (Haskins & 
Williams, 1990), changes in client characteristics that influence supplier costs 
(expansion, financing, profitability and audit risk) (Johnson & Lys, 1990), and agency 
cost variables (Francis & Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992). Healy & Lys (1986) find that 
companies audited by a non-Big Eight firm are more likely to retain a Big Eight acquiror 
following an audit firm merger if they benefit from the Big Eight firm's specialised 
services and/or reputation. A useful summary of many of these studies is provided by 
Yardley, Kauffman, Cairney & Albrecht (1992). 
 
A further type of empirical study to emerge during this period explored the observable 
consequences of auditor change. Although auditor changes generally result in negative 
share price reactions,the price fall is, in most cases, not significant (Fried & Schiff, 1981; 
Nichols & Smith, 1983; Smith, 1988; and Johnson & Lys, 1990). Auditor changes 
associated with disagreements, qualified audit opinions, and changes away from Big 
Eight auditors do, however, result in statistically significant negative price movements, 
especially at high levels of management ownership (Smith, 1988; Eichenseher, Hagigi & 
Shields, 1989; and Albrecht & Lamy, 1992). Hagigi, Kluger & Shields (1993) use capital 
market data to show that auditor change announcements reduce the dispersion of investor 
beliefs by reducing information asymmetries and increasing consensus. A second 
consequence of auditor change following receipt of a qualified opinion has been the 
receipt of `improved' opinions in some studies (Craswell, 1988), but not in others (Chow 
& Rice, 1982 and Smith, 1986).  The level of NAS purchased has been found to decline 
following auditor change (DeBerg, Kaplan & Pany, 1991).  A final consequence relates 
to audit fees. Although early studies did not find evidence of price cutting (Francis, 1984; 
Palmrose, 1986), Simon & Francis (1988) and Ettredge & Greenberg (1992) find an 
average discount in the initial year of 24% and 25%, respectively. Evidence of low-
balling has also been found in the UK (Pong & Whittington, 1994; Gregory & Collier, 
1996), but not in Australia (Butterworth & Houghton, 1995).  
 
Despite recent theoretical developments (especially deAngelo (1981 a,b), Dye (1991), 
and Kanodia & Mukherji (1995)), the theory of auditor choice remains under-specified. 
Extant characterisations of the auditor choice process focus exclusively on the economic 
determinants of the type of audit firm selected and the forces generating change.  This 
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framework is, however, deficient, since qualitative behavioural factors are not 
incorporated. (It may be noted that behavioural extensions to economic models of 
securities market behaviour are being debated in finance (Kleidon, 1987; Miller, 1987)). 
The analysis of market structure and competition based on brand choice and switching 
models has received considerable attention in the marketing literature. Research in this 
area has adopted one of two approaches, depending on whether product alternatives or 
consumers are grouped. Recently, models which simultaneously group consumers and 
brands have been proposed. McCarthy, Kannan, Chandrasekharan & Wright (1992) is a 
typical example of this line of research. Service marketing research, in particular that 
relating to professional services, has revealed the importance of the relationship between 
the buyer and the seller, relative to characteristics of either the buyer or seller in isolation 
(Gronroos, 1990; Sharma, 1991). Sharma (1994) identifies, based on interviews, four 
buyer types (the bargainer, the loyal, the confused, and the competent) based on two 
dimensions of buying situations: piecemeal versus project and price versus quality.  
 
In addition, the failure of some companies to change auditors when it is justified in 
economic terms can be attributed to `inertia'.  More formally, the auditor choice decision 
has a status quo alternative, and it has been shown that people select this alternative 
disproportionately.  The psychological finding is known as `status quo bias' (Samuelson 
& Zeckhauser, 1988). 
 
The economic theory of auditor choice and the empirical statistical analyses of auditor 
changes using publicly available data reviewed in this section have enhanced our 
understanding of the auditor change process. The factors which previous studies have 
identified as influencing the consideration of auditor change, the selection of a new 
auditor, and/or the effects of a change have been incorporated into the survey instrument 
used in the present study. Additional qualitative behavioural factors have been added to 
the factor set to address objectives 3, 6, and 7. The incidence, nature, and impact of 
various auditor change mechanisms (in particular, tendering) (objectives 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 
9) have not been the subject of prior systematic, empirical study. Given the exploratory, 
and hence largely descriptive, nature of this latter aspect of the study, no formal 
hypotheses have been developed. 
 
 METHODS 
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Choice of method 
Our selected method of investigation is a questionnaire for three reasons. First, since it is 
acknowledged that current theory is not well specified (Knapp & Elikai, 1988), the 
general objective of this study is to incorporate qualitative behavioural factors concerning 
auditor-client relationships into the research design, to assess the relative influence of 
each factor type. This necessitated the use of a direct method. Second, other specific 
objectives necessitate the use of direct methods to elicit non-public information. Finally, 
closed-form questions can be identified from the extant auditor choice literature. This 
type of question is preferable to the open-form questions used in early questionnaire 
studies (Converse & Presser, 1986, p.34; Fowler, 1984, p.103).   
 
Sample selection and construction of mailing list 
To address the range of research questions posed above, it was necessary to construct 
two distinct samples. Both samples are drawn from the population of domestic officially 
listed and Unlisted Securities Market (USM) companies in the UK and Ireland as at 30th 
April 1992 (n=2079). A listing of these companies was obtained from Extel Financial 
Ltd. First, to determine the general incidence and nature of certain events, processes and 
attitudes within the population as a whole it was necessary to use a random sample. A 
sample size of 300 (sample 1) is used. Second, to permit specific auditor changes and 
tenders to be investigated using sample sizes which support meaningful analysis, we 
identified, by reference to relevant Stock Exchange Yearbooks (ISE, various) all those 
companies which had voluntarily changed auditor within the preceding three years. 
Involuntary changes arising from audit firm mergers were not included. Apart from those 
companies which were already included in our random sample (sample 1), this process 
yielded a further 208 changers (sample 2). We were then able to partition this combined 
group, according to their questionnaire responses, into (i) changers/non-changers, and (ii) 
tenderers/non-tenderers.  
 
However, it must be understood that an externally or legally recognisable auditor change, 
such as we identified from the Stock Exchange Yearbooks, may not always be viewed in 
the same way by the auditees themselves. In circumstances where there is a change to or 
from a joint appointment, or to or from a single appointment, and one firm remains in 
post, it may be that no real change is perceived by the auditee, especially if the personnel 
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remain the same.  As this study focuses on the declared responses of auditees, where 
discrepancies arose between our respondents' declaration of auditor change and changes 
identified from the Stock Exchange Yearbooks, we have based our analysis on the 
questionnaire responses. An alternative explanation of these discrepancies arises where 
the respondent recently joined the company after a change of auditor, and therefore has 
no recall of the change. 
 
Design of research materials and questionnaire administration procedures 
The research instrument was designed with close reference to the literature on 
questionnaire design (Hoinville, Jowell & Associates, 1978, ch.3; Moser & Kalton, 1979, 
ch.13; Sudman & Bradburn, 1982; Fowler, 1984, ch.6; and Converse & Presser, 1986]. 
The questionnaire contained six sections, of which the third and fourth form the basis of 
the present paper. The first section contained general questions about the company and 
its auditors. The third section identifies those companies which have considered making 
a voluntary change in auditors during the past five years, elicits how seriously this 
change has been considered and asks the respondent to indicate which of 26 reasons 
caused a change to be considered. This section also covers cases of actual change and 
status quo decisions. The fourth section deals with a range of mechanisms (including 
tender) through which change can occur.  
The draft questionnaire was pretested with the assistance of several senior business 
executives and audit partners and the content, ordering and terminology was revised 
accordingly. The questionnaires (serially numbered to permit non-respondents to be 
followed up) were accompanied by an explanatory letter which assured the 
confidentiality of responses and return envelopes were provided. A reminder letter was 
sent out after ten days, with a second request (accompanied by a duplicate copy of the 
questionnaire and the original covering letter) being sent after a further ten days (Fowler, 
1984, ch.3). 
 
 RESULTS 
 
Response rate 
From a total of 508 companies surveyed during June 1992 (samples 1 and 2), 328 usable 
responses were received (a response rate of 65%). The sample design and response rates 
are summarised in Table 1. 
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 [Table 1 about here] 
 
Tests for bias 
Four tests for response bias were performed on the full complement of 508 companies 
surveyed.  First, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric test was used to compare 
responding and non-responding companies on the basis of size (measured as total assets). 
 The hypothesis that the two groups have been drawn from the same population was not 
rejected (α = 0.05).  This comparison was also applied to early (first 100) and late (last 
100) responders,  on the assumption that late responders are similar to non-responders 
(Oppenheim, 1966, p. 34).  Again, the null hypothesis of no difference was not rejected 
(α = 0.05).  Third, the companies were formed into four broad industrial groupings based 
on Stock Exchange groups (capital goods, consumer goods, other and financial).  A 
chi-squared test indicated an association between industry and response/non response 
(α = 0.01).  The percentage of responders was highest among the `other' group (80%) 
and lowest among the consumer group (59%).  Finally, using background data on auditor 
changes drawn from the Stock Exchange Yearbook, responding and non-responding 
companies were compared on the basis of this key summary variable.  A chi-squared test 
indicated an association between recent auditor change (i.e., change during the last five 
years) and response/non response (α = 0.05) with 69% of non-changers responding 
compared to 60% of changers.6 
 
Given the limitations of such tests (discussed by Wallace and Mellor, 1988), and the high 
response rate obtained, we conclude, however, that response bias is not a serious threat to 
the validity of our results.  In addition, nearly all respondents were senior executives who 
one would expect to be intimately involved in the auditor choice decision.  Thus, the risk 
of uninformed respondent bias is considered to be minimal. Table 2 analyses respondents 
by size and industry. 
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
The remainder of this section addresses three issues. First, the general incidence of 
various change mechanisms within the population as a whole is considered, based on 
responses from a random sample (objectives 1 and 2). Second, the reasons for 
 - 13 - 
 
 
considering change, the selection of a new auditor, and the effects of change are 
considered (objectives 3 to 7), using the augmented sample partitioned into `changers' 
and `non-changers'. Finally, the sub-sample of audit tenderers is examined (objectives 8 
and 9). 
 
Incidence of potential change mechanisms and status quo decisions within the 
population based on responses from the random sample (sample 1)  
 
Objective 1 concerns the range of mechanisms through which a change of auditor might 
occur.  In the questionnaire we defined a `competitive tender' as the situation where a 
company seeks a formal tender (i.e., specification of services and fees) from two or more 
auditors other than the incumbent.  We defined the situation where only one other 
auditor is involved as an `approach' made by the company, which was distinguished from 
`unsolicited approaches' made by an audit firm. 
 
In the random sample comprising 210 respondents (sample 1), 50 companies (24%) had 
received, during the past five years, at least one unsolicited approach by another audit 
firm seeking appointment.  This has clearly resulted from the removal of the restrictions 
on solicitation and the existence of competition among audit firms.  In 16 (32%) cases, 
the company had some form of existing relationship with the audit firm making the 
approach and in 37 (74%) cases at least one member of senior management had personal 
experience/knowledge of the firm.  Clearly the network of personal contacts is a very 
important factor. 
 
During the same time period, 54 companies (26%) had made an `approach' to another 
audit firm with a view to appointing them as auditors and in 42 (78%) of these cases the 
company had an existing relationship with, or prior knowledge of, the audit firm. 
 
139 (66%) companies had considered changing their auditor, and 37 (18%) actually 
effected a change during the past five years. The proportion of companies considering 
change can be taken as an indicator of the level of commitment to, and stability of, the 
auditor-client relationship. An 18% rate of auditor change over five years equates to 
3.6% per annum, which is comparable to the rate found by Beattie & Fearnley (1994). 
Similarly, competitive tenders had been considered by 140 companies (67%) during the 
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past five years, with 18% having considered the matter very seriously, 10% seriously, 
11% fairly seriously and 28% casually.  32 sample respondents (15%) had actually 
conducted a tender during this period, with a further 89 (42%) companies indicating that 
there was some likelihood that a tender would be conducted during the subsequent 
twelve months. These findings are summarised in Table 3. 
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
Objective 2 concerns whether the consideration of either a change in auditor or the 
conduct of a competitive tender may be triggered by an unsolicited approach to the 
company.  Using chi-squared tests, highly significant associations between the receipt of 
an unsolicited approach and the consideration of change was found (χ2 = 13.95, p = 0.00) 
and between the receipt of an unsolicited approach and the conduct of a tender (χ2 = 
10.75, p = 0.00). Of those companies which had received such an approach, 88% had at 
least considered changing auditor, compared to 59% of those companies which had not 
received an approach.7  Similar results were obtained for the consideration of tendering, 
with the relevant percentages being 86% and 61% respectively. These associations may 
reflect inertia within the audit market and/or careful targeting by audit firms. Again, 
using chi-squared tests, we investigated whether these associations were related to 
company size by splitting the sample into two groups based on the median level of total 
assets (£50m). The incidence of change consideration following an unsolicited approach 
was identical across the two groups and, although large companies were more likely to 
consider tendering following an unsolicited approach, the difference was not significant 
(χ2 = 1.53, p = 0.216). 
 
Auditor changes 
 
The total 328 respondents were partitioned into three groups on the basis of their 
declared responses: 109 companies which stated that they had changed auditors during 
the past five years (`changers'), 126 companies which had considered (to a greater or 
lesser extent) changing auditors but had not currently made a change (`potential 
changers'), and 93 companies which had not considered changing auditors at all (`non-
changers'). To address objective 3, a comparison of the stated reasons for considering 
change for the changers and potential changers is given in Table 4.  These reasons 
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include both economic and behavioural factors which potentially affect auditor-client 
realignments. We identify 18 reasons as purely economic factors, five reasons purely 
behavioural factors, and the remaining three as having both economic and behavioural 
dimensions. The 109 changers cited a total of 431 reasons, representing an average of 3.9 
contributory reasons each, while the 126 potential changers cited a total of 369 reasons, 
representing an average of 2.9 contributory reasons each. 
 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
It is apparent that there are many significant differences between the two groups.  
Interestingly, given the concern regarding price-cutting, the level of audit fee is of 
significantly less importance to actual changers compared to potential changers, although 
it is still the most frequently cited contributory reason for change for both groups.  This 
level of importance is broadly consistent with the growing body of evidence 
documenting price cutting on initial audit engagements (Simon & Francis, 1988; 
Ettredge & Greenberg, 1990; Pong & Whittington, 1994; and Gregory & Collier, 1996).   
 
Other reasons cited by 25% or more of the changers and which are of significantly more 
importance to the actual changers are dissatisfaction with audit quality (41%), changes in 
company's top management (35%), need for group auditor rationalisation (28%), need for 
Big Six audit firm (26%) and merger/takeover with/by another company (25%).  Lower 
down the table appears a group of reasons which are also of significantly more 
importance to the actual change group and which mostly relate to audit team and the 
influence of third parties.  These reasons are: poor working relationships with audit 
partner/staff, inaccessibility of audit partner, influence of merchant banker/underwriter, 
influence of actual or potential equity or loan providers and need for multinational audit 
firm with foreign offices in same geographical areas as client's operations.  Curiously, the 
use of inexperienced audit engagement staff is of significantly less importance to actual 
changers. It would appear that this problem is not sufficient in itself to precipitate an 
auditor change. Overall, economic factors appear to dominate behavioural factors in 
auditor-client relationships. 
 
Disagreements over accounting principles and disagreement with the audit opinion are 
cited by 6% and 3%, respectively, of actual changers.  The `information suppression 
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hypothesis' posits that the relatively high proportion of `audit failures' following auditor 
changes results from client management successfully concealing sensitive financial 
information (Knapp & Elikai, 1990).  Based on a questionnaire study of 94 US audit 
partners, Knapp & Elikai (1990) find that their respondents believe that 20% of all 
auditor changes result from an information suppression motive.  However, based on the 
evidence from declared responses in the present study, information suppression is a less 
common cause of auditor change in the UK, although the documented level may, 
nevertheless, be considered cause for concern. In addition, given the sensitive nature of 
this issue, it is likely that declared responses underreport the incidence of these reasons 
for change. 
 
A comparison was made between the industry group, size distribution, and existence of 
an audit committee of changers compared to non-changers plus potential changers 
(objective 4). A chi-squared test indicated no association between industry group and 
auditor change (χ2 = 4.69, p = 0.20). Three approximately equal size classes were 
formed, based on information supplied by Extel Financial Ltd.: large companies (total 
assets ≥ £100m), medium companies (£20m ≤ total assets < £100m) and small 
companies (total assets < £20m). The incidence of auditor change was significantly 
higher among smaller companies (χ2 = 13.87, p = 0.001): 21% of large companies 
changed auditors, compared with 36% of medium companies, and 45% of small 
companies. The incidence of auditor change was also significantly higher among 
companies which did not have an audit committee χ2 = 2.60, p = 0.107): 28% of 
companies with an audit committee changed auditor compared with 36% of companies 
with no audit committee. This may be due simply to the fact that smaller companies, 
which are less likely to have an audit committee, are more likely to need to change 
auditors as growth causes changing needs. We speculate that this may be attributable to 
either greater inertia due to the committee structure or the audit committee preventing ad 
hoc changes arising at the instigation of the executive directors (especially the finance 
director).  
 
Next, we investigated whether the declared reasons for change were associated with 
company size (objective 5a). Changers were split into two groups based upon the median 
level of total assets (£22.9 million). Not surprisingly, significantly more small companies 
cited the influence of actual or potential equity or loan providers (χ2 = 4.35, p = 0.037), 
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the need for an audit firm with a local domestic office (χ2 = 2.84, p = 0.092), and the 
need for a national, rather than local, audit firm (χ2 = 6.39, p = 0.011), whereas 
significantly more large companies cited merger/takeover with/by another company (χ2 = 
9.05, p = 0.003) and need for group auditor rationalisation (χ2 = 16.96, p = 0.000). 
Interestingly, there was no significant difference between the frequency with which level 
of audit fee (the most frequently cited reason for considering a change across all 
changers) was cited by small and large companies. 
 
We also investigated whether the declared reasons for change were associated with the 
type of change, i.e. to/from a Big Six/non-Big Six firm (objective 5b). Changers were 
divided into four groups; Big Six to Big Six, Big Six to non-Big Six, non-Big Six to Big 
Six, and non-Big Six to non-Big Six. Using chi-squared tests, significant associations 
were found at the 10% level for 11 of the 26 reasons. Of these, five reasons were cited 
most frequently by the non-Big Six to Big Six group: influence of merchant 
bankers/underwriters (χ2 = 6.87, p = 0.076), influence of actual or potential equity or 
loan providers (χ2 = 9.55, p = 0.023), company growth required increased technical 
capacity from audit firm (χ2 = 14.78, p = 0.002), need for multinational audit firm with 
foreign offices in same geographical areas as foreign operations (χ2 = 14.95, p = 0.002), 
and need for Big Six firm (χ2 = 15.03, p = 0.002). Thus it is the influence of third parties 
and changing needs which tend to cause changes from non-Big Six to Big Six firms. 
These findings are consistent with the existence of a `size effect', whereby smaller 
companies tend to have smaller audit firms (Moizer & Turley, 1987, p.120). Since 
smaller growing companies have changing needs not satisfied by smaller audit firms, this 
results in `Big Six drift'. It is these changes which are responsible for the rising level of 
seller concentration in the UK listed audit market (Beattie & Fearnley, 1994). Five 
reasons were cited most frequently by the (relatively small) Big Six to non-Big Six 
group: audit firm merger (χ2 = 7.24, p = 0.065), change in audit partner (χ2 = 9.35, p = 
0.025), need for local (rather than national) audit firm (χ2 = 16.34, p = 0.001), level of 
audit fee (χ2 = 11.60, p = 0.009), and high turnover of audit engagement staff (χ2 = 
12.33, p = 0.006). This suggests a group of companies who became disenchanted with 
either the nature of Big Six audit staffing or the premium paid for a Big Six firm. 
Merger/takeover with/by another company (χ2 = 10.88, p = 0.012) was most frequently 
cited by the Big Six to Big Six changers. 
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Objective 6 concerns the factors which influenced the selection of a new auditor (stage 
two of the auditor change process). Five factors were cited by over 25% of the 109 
auditor changers (see Table 5).  `Competitive audit fee' is most frequently cited (73%), 
closely followed by `chemistry of relationship with senior audit firm personnel' (63%).  
This illustrates the influence of both economic and behavioural factors in this stage of the 
auditor choice decision.8 We also investigated whether the factors influencing the 
selection of a new auditor were associated with company size. The only significant 
association was in respect of international spread and capabilities of audit firm, the fourth 
most frequently cited factor (χ2 = 4.50, p = 0.034). 45% of large companies cited this, 
compared to only 25% of small companies. 
  
 [Table 5 about here] 
 
Objective 7 concerns the perceived effects of auditor change on the company are 
summarised in Table 6.  Improved audit quality, value for money and reduced audit fee 
are each cited by just over half of the auditor changers.  Next in importance were effects 
relating to other services, while 10% cited `disruption and loss of management time' and 
5% cited a `change of accounting policy(ies)' as an effect.9   
 
 [Table 6 about here] 
 
Audit tenders 
 
Seventy-three companies had conducted a competitive tender during the past five years.  
Addressing objective 8, no significant association was found between client company 
industry group, size, or the existence of an audit committee and the conduct of a 
competitive tender (α = 0.05).  The lack of an association between the existence of an 
audit committee and tendering is perhaps surprising, since anecdotal evidence suggests 
that non-executive directors (who often form the majority of audit committees) generally 
favour tenders relative to executive directors. This is attributed to non-executive directors 
focusing on potential fee reductions rather than the costs of tendering and change which 
fall on the company.  
 
Objective 9 was to collect descriptive data on the tendering process. Of the  73 tendering 
 - 19 - 
 
 
companies, 57 (78%) sought a tender from the incumbent auditor.  Thus 22% of 
incumbent auditors were not invited to tender, implying that the company had already 
taken the decision to change auditors.  It has been argued that putting the audit out to 
tender is merely a strategy adopted for renegotiating the audit fee with the incumbent 
auditor (MacErlean, 1993, p.43).  In our sample, 82% of the tendering companies also 
changed auditors, suggesting that this is a strategy which is neither widely adopted nor 
successfully employed. Thus, once a company has decided to incur the costs of actually 
conducting a tender (rather than merely threatening to do so), the incumbent has only an 
18% chance of retaining the client. 
 
The number of tenders invited, including the incumbent where relevant, ranged from two 
to eight, as shown in Table 7, with a mean of 3.6.  Each bid must be evaluated, which is a 
costly exercise for the client, however the larger the number of bidders, the higher the 
probability that the lowest-cost supplier will be included and the greater the level of 
competition in the bidding process.  The bases on which companies selected those audit 
firms invited to tender are shown in Table 8.  Audit firm reputation was most frequently 
cited, either exclusively (22% of companies), or in combination with other factors (49% 
of companies).  Previous knowledge and experience of the audit firm was the next most 
important basis for selection, with the expectation of a reduced audit fee cited by less 
than 50% of companies.10   
 
 [Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
 
Eleven companies (15%) were approached by additional audit firms seeking to tender - 
in 3 cases the approach was from one additional firm, in six cases from two firms and in 
2 cases from three firms.  These audit firms may have become aware of the tender 
through media comment or personal contact. 
 
Currently, little is known about the audit tendering process.  We therefore identified five 
stages in this process: (i) initiation of idea, (ii) invitation of bids, (iii) attendance at 
presentations, (iv) evaluation of bids, and (v) final decision, and sought to identify those 
individuals or groups within the company who were involved in these stages.  The results 
are summarised in Table 9, which distinguishes sole from joint involvement in each 
tender stage.  A number of observations can be drawn from the general pattern of 
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responses in this table.  First, fewer parties are involved in the early stages of the 
tendering process (initiation and invitation of bids) compared to the later stages 
(presentations, evaluation and decision), with the early stages more frequently being the 
responsibility of a sole party.  Second, the sole party most often responsible for these 
early stages was the finance director, who initiated the idea in 27 companies and invited 
bids in 39 companies. Thus audit committees generally play a passive role in setting the 
process of auditor change in motion. Third, responsibility for attending and evaluating 
audit firm presentations was generally not the sole responsibility of any one individual or 
group.  Those parties most frequently involved were, in descending order and in both 
stages, the finance director, managing director, chairperson, chief accountant, audit 
committee and audit committee chairperson.  Fourth, the final decision was taken by a 
single party in 23 companies; most frequently by the chairperson (five cases) and the 
audit committee (five cases).  Finally, the pervasive influence of the finance director 
throughout the process, and the restricted role of the audit committee, is clearly apparent. 
 In this context, it should be noted that at the time of this study only 32 of the companies 
which tendered (44%) did in fact have an audit committee.11 Further research based on a 
survey of audit committee members would provide triangulation of these findings. 
 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The extent of price cutting following tender is summarised in Table 10.  Two points can 
be noted from this table.  First, there does not appear to be any difference between the 
pattern of prices quoted by incumbent auditors and others, when compared to the current 
level of audit fees.  Both sets of auditors are prepared to offer significant fee reductions.  
59% of incumbent auditors quoted materially (i.e., 5%) below the current fee level, 
compared with 69% of other quotes.  Second, just over one third of all quotes are more 
than 20% lower than the current audit fee, which suggests widespread undercutting.  
These results support those of Gregory & Collier (1996), who estimate a discount of 
22.4% for the 28 companies in their study who changed auditors in the past three years. It 
can also be noted that 88% of respondent companies considered the fees quoted to be 
realistic. 
 
 [Table 10 about here] 
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Discussion 
 
Major findings of this study relate to the role of audit fee level in audit relationships and 
the influence of behavioural factors in the process of auditor choice.  Each is now 
discussed briefly.  The relative importance of audit fee levels to auditees appears to 
change throughout the auditor selection and change process. When selecting firms to 
tender, the expectation of a reduced audit fee is not a top priority. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of a study by Beattie & Fearnley (1995) which reports that 
low absolute level of audit fee is ranked in importance only 22nd out of 29 audit firm 
characteristics. In triggering the consideration of change, however, and in either selecting 
the new auditor or making the status quo decision, fees are the primary decision variable. 
 This may occur because the decision maker can more readily justify their selection 
decision to third parties on the basis of an observable benefit such as fees. Fees are, 
however, of significantly less importance to actual changers compared to potential 
changers, and fees are seldom the only reason for change. The existence of substantial 
price competition in the tendering process is demonstrated by the willingness of audit 
firms involved in tenders to quote materially below the current fee level.   
 
The relative influence of economic and behavioural factors varies throughout the change 
process. Economic factors dominate in the decision to change auditors; behavioural 
factors seldom being the sole reason for change. In selecting a new auditor, however, the 
`chemistry of the relationship with senior audit firm personnel', although secondary to 
price considerations, dominates factors relating to the range and level of service offered. 
It may be that companies genuinely consider the quality of relationships to be of greater 
importance to them than service issues. Alternatively, companies may take for granted 
that all audit firms will deliver an acceptable range and level of service. The influence of 
behavioural factors in the auditor selection and change process is further revealed in the 
use of personal contacts made by both auditors and auditees.  This is evident both in 
unsolicited approaches and invitations to tender.  
 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Further understanding of the motivations for auditor change, and the impact of increased 
competition within the external audit market, is hampered by the fact that these 
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motivations are not generally observable. Casual empirical evidence suggests that the 
level of audit fee is a major cause of recent auditor changes, with competitive tenders a 
primary mechanism of change. In this paper the reasons for auditor change are elicited by 
means of a closed-form questionnaire instrument developed from the extant literature. 
Since this study is conducted in a more overtly competitive environment than existed at 
the time of prior surveys, it provides a relevant setting for the examination of the current 
dynamics of the market.    
 
The incidence of potential change mechanisms within the population  as a whole is 
estimated from a questionnaire survey of 300 randomly selected listed UK companies.  
Between 1987 and 1992, 24% of companies had received an unsolicited approach, 26% 
had made an approach, 67% had considered conducting a competitive tender, 15% had 
conducted a competitive tender and 66% had considered changing auditors. These 
findings jointly indicate a high degree of potential instability in the market. Moreover, 
positive, statistically significant associations were found between unsolicited approaches 
(which were not permitted until 1983) and the consideration of either a change in auditor 
or the conduct of a competitive tender. 
 
Based on a choice-based sample of 109 companies which had recently changed auditor, 
auditor change was found not to be associated with industry group, but was significantly 
higher among smaller companies and companies with no audit committee. Level of audit 
fee was the most frequently cited reason for changing auditor and the most frequently 
cited factor influencing the selection of a new auditor. When selecting firms to tender, 
however, the expectation of a reduced audit fee was not a top priority. Significant 
differences were found between the reasons for auditor change and the reasons for 
considering, but not actually making, an auditor change. In particular, fees were of 
significantly less importance to actual changers. The reasons for change were found to 
vary with company size. Small companies were more likely to cite as a reason for change 
the influence of third party capital providers and changing needs. Large companies were 
more likely to cite merger/takeover and group rationalisation as a reason for change. The 
reasons for change were also associated with the type of change. The influence of third 
parties and changing needs were most frequently cited in non-Big Six to Big Six 
changes, whereas dissatisfaction with aspects of audit staffing and the premium paid for a 
Big Six firm were most frequently cited in changes from Big Six to non-Big Six.  
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In general, economic factors were found to dominate behavioural factors in auditor-client 
relationships. Economic factors were found to dominate the auditor change decision; in 
selecting a new auditor, however, the `chemistry' of the relationship with senior audit 
firm personnel (i.e., a behavioural consideration) was more important than the range and 
level of service offered. Further research into the dimensions of the `chemistry' factor is 
clearly warranted. 
 
Aspects of the audit tender process were explored based on a sample of 73 companies 
which had conducted a competitive tender.  Audit tendering was not associated with 
industry group, company size or the existence of an audit committee. Findings indicated 
that 55% of auditor changes were effected by means of a tender, with the incumbent 
auditor having only an 18% chance of retaining the client. This is despite the fact that 
significant fee reductions were, in general, quoted by the incumbent, in common with 
other bidders. Thus tenders are an effective fee cutting mechanism in the year of change. 
An investigation of the parties involved in five identified stages in the tender process 
revealed that the finance director dominates the process, and that the role of audit 
committees is restricted, again particularly in the early stages. 
 
Whilst we have attempted to minimise and identify the threats to validity inherent in the 
questionnaire approach (i.e., through rigorous piloting, thorough administration 
procedures, and tests for bias), they cannot be eliminated completely. In particular, the 
findings are based on declared responses rather than latent facts.  Although there has 
been found to be `a general congruence' between the findings of direct and indirect 
methods of eliciting reasons for auditor change (Eichenseher and Shields, 1983, p.31), 
further research using a variety of methods is desirable. In particular, in-depth interviews 
with changers would provide additional insights into the behavioural aspects of auditor 
change and the nature of the tender process. Additionally, further research could explore 
the extent to which auditor changes are averted by fee reductions from the incumbent. 
 
In due course it may be possible to synthesise economic and behavioural/cognitive 
elements into a theory which is capable  of explaining both individual auditor choice 
decisions and decisions in the aggregate. In the meantime, this study provides further 
insights into the dynamics of the external audit market. 
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 NOTES 
 
 
1. For example, in the UK, significant audit fee reductions attributed to keen negotiation include those of Burtons, Budgens and
the TSB (Accountancy Age: 11th June 1992, 3rd September 1992, and 25th February 1993). Audit fees were reported to be a
significant factor in the change of auditor following tenders by Prudential Assurance, Gresham Telecomputing, Tomkins, John
Foster, and RAC (Accountancy, August 1991; Accountancy Age: 10th October 1991 and 30th April 1992; AA Magazine, May
1992; Accountancy Age, 27th April 1995). 
 
2. For example, in the UK, accounting problems and disputes were alleged to have been the cause of auditor changes by
Menzies, Holmes Protection, Alexanders Holdings and Adams & Co. (Accountancy Age: 5th September 1991, 28th November
1991, and 3rd December 1992). 
3. The Financial Reporting Council and its associated bodies was set up to control the process of standard setting following the
Dearing Report (1988). 
4. Direct costs to the audit firm include search costs and start up costs (Krishnan, 1992), with start up costs varying due to cross-
sectional variation in the level of non-audit services (NAS) and knowledge spillovers (DeBerg, Kaplan & Pany, 1991).  Direct
costs to the client concern loss of management time.  Indirect costs arise from increased information risk, i.e., suspicion of
opinion shopping (Williams, 1988), which Smith & Nichols (1982) have shown to result in negative share price reactions. 
5. Client structure is measured in terms of industry stability while auditor structure relates to the flexibility permitted in audit
planning and testing.  
6. This test does not distinguish potential changers from other non-changers, since the required information is not available for
non-respondents. 
7. This is consistent with recent evidence from the U.S. audit market, which finds that, during the period 1980 to 1988, clients
are more likely to change auditors when direct solicitation is allowed (Chaney, Jeter & Shaw, 1997). 
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8. The `other' reasons cited by respondents included: group auditors (5 cases), auditors of company recently merged with (2
cases), auditors of main shareholder (1 case), suitable location  of offices nationally (2 cases), recommendation (2 cases),
knowledge of firm (3 cases), to preserve a good partner relationship following partner change of firm (1 case), move away from
Big Six (2 cases), need for national/international firm (2 cases) and to avoid a big firm which competes with the company in an
area of business (1 case). 
9. The `other' effects cited by respondents were: improved relationships (5 cases), close proximity of overseas/local offices to
operations (2 cases); better tax advice (1 case), decrease in audit quality (1 case), independent approach (1 case) and too early to
say (2 cases). 
10. The `other' bases for selection related to existing relationships within the group (3 cases), location of offices (2 cases),
perception of compatibility of the two firms' styles, technical presentation of audit procedures and practices, personal chemistry,
and partner's attitude (1 case each). 
11. This study was conducted before the Cadbury committee's proposals were adopted by the Stock Exchange. 
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 Table 1 Sample Design and Response Rates 
 
 Sample type: 
 Random  
 (sample 1)
Choice-based 
(sample 2) 
 
Total
Sample size 300 208 508
Usable responses 210 118 328
Response rate 70% 58% 65%
 - 36 - 
 
 
 
 Table 2  Analysis of Respondents by Company Size and Industry Group 
 
  Random sample Choice-based sample 
 
Size group 
Total assets 
(£million)
No. % No. % 
Small < 20 74 35.9 49 43.4 
Medium 20 - 100 80 38.8 37 32.7 
Large ≥ 100 52 25.3 27 23.9 
 2061 100.0 1131 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Random sample    Choice-based sample 
Industry group No. % No. % 
Capital goods 70 33.3 29 24.8 
Consumer goods 48 22.9 37 31.6 
Other (inc. oil and gas) 50 23.8 26 22.2 
Financial 42 20.0 25 21.4 
 210 100.0 1171 100.0 
 
 
Note 1: Data on several companies was not available. 
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Table 3 Incidence of Potential Change Mechanisms and the Stability of Auditor-
Client Relationships within the Random Sample over a Five Year Period  
 
 
 
  
 Unsolicited approach from audit firm   24% 
 
 Approach to audit firm with a view to appointment26% 
 
 Change of auditor considered    66% 
 
 Actual change of auditor     18% 
 
 Audit tender considered     67% 
 
 Audit tender conducted     15% 
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 Table 4  Stated Reasons for Consideration of a Change in Auditor 
 Auditor changers  Auditor non-changers   
 
Rank1 
  
 Reason2 
No. of 
companies
 % 
(n=109)
 No. of 
companies 
 % 
(n=126)
 χ2 
note 3
1.  Level of audit feea 53  49 93  74 ** 
2.  Dissatisfaction with audit quality (i.e. auditor's ability 
to detect problems)a 
45  41 32  25 ** 
3.  Changes in company's top managementc 38  35 30  24 * 
4.  Need for group auditor rationalisationa 31  28 14  11 ** 
5.  Need for Big Six audit firma 28  26 6  5 ** 
6.  Merger/takeover with/by another companya 27  25 10  8 ** 
7.  Company growth required increased technical 
capacity from audit firma 
24  22 17  13 NS 
8.  Poor working relationships with audit partner/staffb 19  17 11  9 * 
9.  Need for multinational audit firm with foreign offices 
in same geographical areas as client's operationsa 
18  16 8  6 * 
10.  Inaccessibility of audit partnerb 17  16 5  4 ** 
11=.  Need for additional servicesa 15  14 11  9 NS 
11=.  Personality clashes with audit partner/staffb 15  14 17  13 NS 
13.  Influence of merchant bankers/underwritera 14  13 6  5 * 
14.  Influence of actual or potential equity or loan 
providersa 
13  12 5  4 * 
15.  Audit firm mergerb 11  10 19  15 NS 
16.  Change in audit partnerb 10  9 16  13 NS 
17.  High turnover of audit engagement staffc 8  7 19  15 NS 
18=.  Use of inexperienced audit engagement staffc 7  6 22  17 ** 
18=.  Disagreements over accounting principlesa 7  6 11  9 NS 
20=.  Need for national, rather than local, audit firma 6  5 4  3 NS 
20=.  Need for audit firm with local domestic officea 6  5 3  2 NS 
22.  Need for audit firm specialising in client's industrya 5  5 3  2 NS 
23=.  Influence of regulatorsa 4  4 2  2 NS 
23=.  Influence of company's day-to-day bankersa 4  4 3  2 NS 
25=.  Disagreement with audit opiniona 3  3 2  2 NS 
25=.  Need for local, rather than national, audit firma 
 
3  3 -  - NS 
Notes: 
1. Ranks are based on frequency of citation by the auditor change group. 
2. Reasons are classified as follows: a = economic; b = behavioural; and c = mix of economic and behavioural dimensions. 
3. NS = not significant; * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
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 Table 5  Stated Factors Influencing Selection of New Auditor 
 
 
 
Factor1 
 Number of 
companies 
 % 
(n=109)
 
1. Competitive audit fee 
  
80 73
2. `Chemistry' of relationship with senior audit firm 
personnel 
 69 63
3. Business understanding  50 46
4. International spread and capabilities of audit firm  42 39
5. Relevant tax expertise  28 26
6. `Other'  27 25
 
Note 1: Factors are as shown in decreasing frequency of citation. 
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 Table 6  Stated Effects of Auditor Change on Company 
 
 
 
Effect1 
 Number of 
companies 
 % 
(n=109)
 
1. Improved audit quality 
  
61 56
2=. Reduction in audit fee  60 55
2=. Improved value for money of audit service  60 55
4. Improved quality of management advice, including 
management letters 
 46 42
5. Provision of additional services  26 24
6. Disruption and loss of management time  11 10
7. Change of accounting policy(ies)  5 5
8. `Other'  12 11
 
Note 1: Effects are shown in decreasing frequency of citation. 
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 Table 7  Number of Tenders Invited (Including Incumbent) 
 
 
Number  Frequency 
 
2 
 
 6
3  31
4  25
5  5
6  2
7  1
8  1
Item non-response 2
  Total 73
 
Mean 
 
 3.6
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 Table 8  Bases for Selection of Audit Firms Invited to Tender 
 
 
 
Basis 
 Number of 
companies 
 % 
(n=73) 
 
1. Reputation of audit firm 
  
52 71
2. Previous knowledge and experience of audit firm  37 51
3. Expectation  of reduced audit fee  30 41
4. `Other'  9 12
 Table 9  Parties Involved in the Stages of the Tendering Process 
 
   Stage in tendering process
   
 Initiation of idea
  
 Invitation of bids
  Attendance of 
 presentations
  
 Evaluation of bids
  
 Final decision 
    Level of involvement    Level of involvement    Level of involvement    Level of involvement    Level of involvement 
 Party    Sole   Joint  Combined   Sole   Joint  Combined   Sole   Joint  Combined   Sole   Joint   Combined    Sole   Joint  Combined 
Finance director 
 
Managing director 
 
Chairperson 
 
Chief executive 
 
Company secretary 
 
Audit committee 
 
Group financial controller 
 
Holding company 
 
Shareholder 
 
Chief accountant 
 
Non-executive director(s) 
 
Board of directors 
 
Audit committee chairperson 
 
Group internal audit manager 
      7  2
        
27
 
9 
 
4 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
19
11
7
-
1
1
-
-
-
5
-
-
-
-
46
20
11
3
2
2
1
1
1
5
-
-
-
-
39
3
-
2
2
2
1
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
15
8
6
-
1
3
-
-
-
7
1
-
3
1
54
11
6
2
3
5
1
-
1
7
1
-
3
1
8
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
49
35
23
2
2
14
-
-
-
23
3
-
13
-
57
36
24
3
3
16
-
-
-
24
3
-
13
-
2
-
-
1
2
-
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
50
30
23
3
1
15
1
-
-
22
3
-
12
1
57
32
23
3
2
17
1
-
1
22
4
-
13
1
3
5
2
-
5
-
-
1
-
2
3
-
-
44
30
32
2
3
16
-
-
-
9
2
2
9
-
46 
 
33 
 
37 
 
4 
 
3 
 
21 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1 
 
9 
 
4 
 
5 
 
9 
 
- 
TOTAL 48 44 92 50 45 95 15 164 179 15 161 176 23 149 172
Not applicable/item non-response   7  5   5  4  2 
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 Table 10  Relationship of Audit Fees Quoted in Tender 
 Documents to Current Audit Fee 
 
 
Audit fee differential 
 Incumbent auditor's
quote 
  Other audit 
firms' quotes 
  No.  %  No.  % 
More than 5% higher  3 5 8 5 
Within 5%  23 36 40 26 
Between 5% and 20% lower  15 24 53 34 
More than 20% lower  22 35 55 35 
Total 63 100%  156 100%
 
